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michael.weber@uni-ulm.de (M.Weber).Vehicular communication systems are an emerging form of communication that enables new ways of
cooperation among vehicles, traffic operators, and service providers. However, many vehicular applica-
tions rely on continuous and detailed location information of the vehicles, which has the potential to
infringe the users’ location privacy. A multitude of privacy-protection mechanisms have been proposed
in recent years. However, few efforts have been made to develop privacy metrics that can provide a quan-
titative way to assess the privacy risk, evaluate the effectiveness of a given privacy-enhanced design, and
explore the full possibilities of protection methods.
In this paper, we present a location privacy metric for measuring location privacy in vehicular commu-
nication systems. As computers do not forget and most drivers of motor vehicles follow certain daily driv-
ing patterns, if a user’s location information is gathered and stored over a period of time, e.g., weeks or
months, such cumulative information might be exploited by an adversary performing a location privacy
attack to gain useful information on the user’s whereabouts. Thus to precisely reflect the underlying pri-
vacy values, in our approach we take into account the accumulated information. Specifically, we develop
methods and algorithms to process, propagate, and reflect the accumulated information in the privacy
measurements. The feasibility and correctness of our approaches are evaluated by various case studies
and extensive simulations. Our results show that accumulated information, if available to an adversary,
can have a significant impact on location privacy of the users of vehicular communication systems. The
methods and algorithms developed in this paper provide detailed insights into location privacy and thus
contribute to the development of future-proof, privacy-preserving vehicular communication systems.
 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Vehicular communication systems are an emerging form of
communication that enables newways of cooperation among vehi-
cles, traffic operators, and service providers. Based on Dedicated
Short Range Communications (DSRC) technology, vehicles can
communicate among each others and with the entities in infra-
structure networks via Roadside Units (RSU) to deliver and ex-
change high-definition information about themselves and their
environments. As one of the key technologies to build an Intelli-
gent Transportation System (ITS) in the near future, vehicular com-
munication systems are envisioned to significantly improve road
safety, traffic efficiency, and driver convenience. Example vehicular
communication applications include collision warning, floating car
data, and location-based services. If deployed, vehicular communi-
cation systems will become one of the biggest implementations of
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET).ll rights reserved.
, f.kargl@utwente.nl (F. Kargl),1.1. Motivation
However, many envisioned vehicular communication (VC)
applications rely on continuous and detailed location and time
information of the vehicles. This requires all vehicles to frequently
send their location information in terms of current positions,
speeds, and headings, combined with a time stamp in so-called
‘‘beacon” or ‘‘heartbeat” messages openly to all of their neighbors.
The message from a vehicle can be eavesdropped by anyone within
the radio transmission range. By establishing a network of receiv-
ers, an adversary, i.e., any individual or public, private, commercial,
or criminal organization, can collect and abuse the location
information to its advantage. Vehicles are personal devices and
usually owned for a long period of time. The whereabouts of a
vehicle reveal the movements and activities of its driver and pas-
sengers. Sending and disseminating location information has the
potential to infringe location privacy1 of the users of vehicular
communication systems.1 In [3], location privacy is defined as the ability of an individual to move in public
space with the expectation that under normal circumstances their location will not be
systematically and secretly recorded for later use.
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identified in recent years and a number of privacy-protection
mechanisms have been proposed [20,26,6,28,16]. Clearly, without
proper privacy protection, vehicular communication systems pose
a severe privacy threat to potential users.
Nevertheless, to assess a system’s ability to preserve the users’
location privacy and to evaluate the effectiveness of any protec-
tion mechanism, a metric for measuring the level of users’ loca-
tion privacy is crucial and indispensable. In other words, a
location privacy metric that numerically expresses privacy will
be a more precise and rigorous way to reflect the provided pri-
vacy level than just stating that a system provides ‘‘adequate pri-
vacy”. For example, we need a metric to tell us that a user’s
privacy level has been increased by 20% after applying one of
the protection mechanisms. Furthermore, privacy does not come
for free. Privacy-protection mechanisms usually have side-effects
in terms of communication and computation overhead [7] and
deployment cost. In addition, privacy requirements are among
a set of requirements for vehicular communication systems
[29], which are sometimes conflicting, e.g., the need for strong
identification for authentication and accountability versus the
need for anonymity for privacy. This determines that future
vehicular communication systems will have to consider and har-
monize a conglomeration of requirements from different stake-
holders. Therefore, a privacy metric can greatly contribute to
an overall system design process that balances and optimizes
various requirements and finds the best privacy protection
available.
However, so far the main focus in the literature is on the devel-
opment of privacy-protection mechanisms. In contrast, the effort
to develop an appropriate metric that reflects the underlying level
of location privacy of the users of vehicular communication sys-
tems has been overlooked at large. Hence the privacy values re-
lated to location privacy cannot be quantitatively and explicitly
expressed. Consequently, the usefulness of any given privacy-pro-
tection mechanisms cannot be rigorously evaluated, the trustwor-
thiness and the privacy risks of future vehicular communication
systems cannot be strictly assessed, and the range of possible pro-
tection methods cannot be fully explored.1.2. Problem statement
In our previous work [23], we proposed a trip-based location
privacy metric to measure the level of location privacy of individ-
ual users of vehicular communication systems. We identified that
the most privacy-relevant location information in vehicular com-
munication systems is the origin and destination of a vehicle
trip,2 which reveal the driver’s identity and social activities and
are susceptible to a number of attacks such as home identification
[16,12] and inference attack [21]. Based on the observation that
the uncertainty of a potential adversary and a user’s privacy level
are indeed two sides of the same coin, the metric measures the le-
vel of location privacy as the linkability of vehicle trips to the indi-
viduals who generate them. Taking an information-theoretic
approach, the uncertainty in the linkability is expressed in proba-
bilities and quantified into entropy. To be able to take meaningful
measurements on dynamic and continuous systems like vehicular
communication systems, we introduced the concept of a snapshot.
A snapshot limits the privacy-related information to an arbitrary
defined period of time such that we can base our measurements
on a set of stable and confined information. Section 2 gives a more
detailed description of our previous work.2 In [18], a vehicle trip is defined as a trip by a single privately operated vehicle
(POV) regardless of the number of persons in the vehicle.However, our previous work only considers a single snapshot. To
precisely reflect the level of location privacy, it is reasonable to as-
sume that information available to an adversary is not limited to
only a short period of time. Instead, it is reasonable to assume that
a determined adversary will do its best to obtain as much informa-
tion as possible and to decrease the uncertainty of the obtained
information. Thus the adversary will take advantage of the accumu-
lated information, i.e., privacy-related information captured for a
long period of time, e.g., weeks or months.
To reflect such assumption in our metric, we need to take
time into consideration and measure location privacy in a long-
term perspective. Hence, instead of one single snapshot, now
the metric should be able to base its measurements on multiple
snapshots, i.e., a sequence of snapshots taken at successive times
with equal interval among them. Measurements based on
multiple snapshots should reflect the impact of the accumulated
information on the level of location privacy in vehicular commu-
nication systems. Intuitively, the more information an adversary
obtains, the easier it can draw conclusions with less
uncertainties.
For measuring long-term location privacy, several issues need
to be addressed such as the challenges to model, process,
and reflect the accumulated information in the privacy
measurements.1.3. Contribution
The relation and the impact of the accumulated information on
location privacy have not been investigated previously. In this pa-
per, we identify and address this issue by extending the current
location privacy metric to take into account accumulated informa-
tion. Therefore, the metric will becomemore precise to reflect loca-
tion privacy of the users of vehicular communication systems. Our
contributions in this paper are:
 to develop methods to model accumulated information,
 to design approaches and algorithms to process, propagate, and
reflect the accumulated information in location privacy
measurements,
 to devise approaches to evaluate the feasibility and correctness
of our approaches by various case studies and extensive
simulations.
Notice that this paper includes significant extensions of our pre-
vious conference paper [24]. In the extensions, we develop a heu-
ristic algorithm to propagate and reflect accumulated information
in the metric under extremely dynamic situations. We further eval-
uate the feasibility of the heuristic algorithm by extensive simula-
tions. With the heuristic algorithm, the location privacy metric is
more robust in processing accumulated information and thus more
precise to reflect long-term location privacy. Moreover, due to the
heuristic algorithm’s ability to process accumulated information
under dynamic situations, we gain more insights into location pri-
vacy, which contributes to the design of future-proof, privacy-pre-
serving vehicular communication systems.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 gives the background
information on the basics of the trip-based location privacy met-
ric. Section 3 describes the method to model accumulated infor-
mation in multiple snapshots. Section 4 introduces two exact
approaches to process and reflect accumulated information in
the metric. Section 5 evaluates the two approaches by case stud-
ies and simulations. Section 6 presents the heuristic algorithm
followed by the corresponding feasibility evaluation in Section
7. Section 8 discusses the related work, followed by the conclu-
sion in Section 9.
Fig. 2. Extracted probability distribution as hub-and-spoke.
1416 Z. Ma et al. / Computer Communications 33 (2010) 1414–14272. Metric fundamentals
This section provides the necessary background information on
the trip-based location privacy metric introduced in [23].
In vehicular communication systems, each time a vehicle sends
a message, it reveals its location in the system. Although there are
different levels of granularities, the location information in vehicu-
lar communication systems can be categorized into three types,
i.e., single locations, tracks, and trips. A single message reveals a
single location of a vehicle. A track reveals a vehicle’s movement
in space and time. To obtain the information on tracks, an adver-
sary can use various algorithms and methods [34,14,11] to ‘‘link
the dots”, i.e., to track a segment of a vehicle’s movement by link-
ing the messages belong to the same vehicle. Due to uncertainty,
the relation of the messages and the tracks are commonly ex-
pressed in probabilities. If an adversary can follow a vehicle from
end to end, i.e., from origin to destination, the adversary obtains
the information on vehicle trips. Location information only be-
comes privacy-relevant if it can be linked to identifiable individu-
als. Since for privacy concerns vehicles are very likely to use
pseudonyms in communications [25,22], information on single
locations and tracks will be less privacy-sensitive than the infor-
mation on trips, which can be used to infer an individual’s identity
and activities.
To measure privacy, we let the metric capture the information
on trips and individuals in an arbitrary defined area and time per-
iod. Hence the metric virtually takes a ‘‘snapshot” of the dynamic
vehicular communication systems. The information captured in
the snapshot is then modeled in a weighted tripartite graph, shown
in Fig. 1. The graph contains three distinct sets of vertices, i.e., I, O,
and D, which represent Individuals, Origins and Destinations of the
trips. An adversary’s knowledge on the linkability of an individual
to a set of trips is expressed in probability distributions. The prob-
abilities are used as the weights on the directed edges. For exam-
ple, pjk is a weight on an edge ðv j;vkÞ between the vertices
v j and vk.
For an individual to make a trip (e.g., o1 ! d1), he or she must
start from one of the origins, e.g., i1 from o1. If the trip from o1 ends
at one of the destinations, it must be possible to link i1 to d1 as well.
Due to the uncertainty in the information, there can be many of
such possible linkings among the vertices. A closed walk or a cycle
starting from a vertex is and passing vertices foj; dkg in the graph
has the semantics of is’s probability pjk to make a trip with origin
oj and destination dk. By collecting all cycles connected to a
particular individual in the graph, we can extract the probability
distribution of the linkability of that individual to a set of trips.
The probability distribution can be graphically expressed as a
hub-and-spoke structure, shown in Fig. 2. The last spoke withFig. 1. Snapshot information modeled in weighted tripartite graph.probability pc in the clock-wise order denotes the probability of
an individual not making any trips, i.e., ‘‘staying at home”.
Using the notations specified by the tripartite graph (see Fig. 1),
the normalized probabilities p^jk on each of the spokes are calcu-
lated as
p^jk ¼ pðis; ojÞpðoj;dkÞpðdk; isÞPm
j¼1
Pm
k¼1pðis; ojÞpðoj;dkÞpðdk; isÞ
ð1 pcÞ
where pðis; ojÞpðoj;dkÞpðdk; isÞ is the product of the three probabili-
ties on the cycle with vertices is; oj;dk. The rest of the equation nor-
malize the probability distribution to 1. The complementary
probability pc is calculated as
pc ¼ 1
Xm
j¼1
pðis; ojÞ
Applying Shannon’s entropy [31], we can quantify the uncertainty
in the information about is in entropy as
HðisÞ ¼ 
Xm
j¼1
Xm
k¼1
p^jklog p^jk
 þ pc logðpcÞ !
where the logarithm is taken to base 2 to have a unit of bit. HðisÞ is
used as a quantitative measure of is’s level of location privacy. The
privacy level is directly proportional to the value of entropy, i.e.,
the higher the entropy, the higher the privacy level, and vice versa.
Entropy reaches its maximum if all trips are equally probable. For a
snapshot withm2 O/D pairs, the maximum entropy for each individ-
uals in the snapshot is
Hmax ¼ logðm2 þ 1Þ
with 1 accounting for the individual not making any trips [23].
3. Accumulated information
Using snapshots enables us to capture privacy-relevant infor-
mation from vehicular communication systems, which are contin-
uous and dynamic in nature. However, privacy measurements
based on a single snapshot only reflect the privacy values in a short
period of time. It is reasonable to assume that a determined adver-
sary will collect as much information as possible over a long period
of time to work for its advantage. Intuitively, information accumu-
lated over time should help to reveal more facts about the individ-
uals and their vehicle movements.
To reflect this more realistic assumption on the adversary, in-
stead of one snapshot, we extend the metric to include consecutive
snapshots. Thus the metric yields measurements on ‘‘multiple
snapshots”. In a single snapshot, the information needed for mea-
suring each individual can be represented by a hub-and-spoke
structure shown in Fig. 2. When more snapshots are added to the
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ual i becomes a sequence of hub-and-spoke structures ordered in
time as shown in Fig. 3. Notice that only one individual is shown
in Fig. 3. But we can imagine that for each of the individuals cap-
tured in the snapshots, we can extract the information and build
a similar sequence of hub-and-spoke structures. For simplicity in
formulations, we will only consider one individual i in the rest of
the paper. The same formulas and procedures are applicable to
any of the other individuals captured in the snapshots. However,
in our future work, we will further investigate the interrelations
among individuals and their impacts on the level of location
privacy.
There are several observable characteristics of the consecutive
hub-and-spoke structure (in Fig. 3) and the accumulated informa-
tion contained within. First, i can be linked to different trips from
snapshot to snapshot. The differences are in the number, as well
as the origins and destinations of the trips. We name the assort-
ment of trips related to i in a snapshot a trip constellation. Second,
the accumulated information has two dimensions, i.e., the one ex-
tends into the diversity of trip constellations, and the other extends
along the timeline. Third, given the fact that many individuals use
vehicles to fulfill demands on activities on a daily basis [1], accu-
mulated information is likely to contain an individual’s trip pat-
terns, i.e., regularly occurring trips with the same origins and
destinations. By same trip we mean two or more trips have the
same origin and destination, e.g., the same garage, parking lot, or
street parking space, etc.
To model accumulated information in multiple snapshots, we
represent the hub-and-spoke structure in a more compact way.
Let S be the set of all snapshots and let T be the set of all trips con-
sidered for an individual i, then snapshot St reflects the relation of i
to a set of trips at the time period t. We define St to be
St :¼ ðTk;pkÞjTk 2 T; pk 20;1;
X
k
pk ¼ 1; k ¼ 1; . . . ;nt
( )
ð1Þ
where ðTk;pkÞ is a tuple in which Tk denotes a specific trip (i.e., the
kth trip) and pk is the corresponding probability of that trip. Only
trips with probabilities bigger than 0 are assigned to i. As trip con-
stellations can vary in snapshots, we denote the number of possible
trips at t by a variable nt . For the tth snapshot, each Tk represents a
spoke and each pk represents the corresponding probability on that
spoke. For simplicity, the last spoke denoting the probability of an
individual ‘‘staying at home” is also represented as one of the trips.
As the metric uses entropy to quantify the uncertainty in the infor-
mation (cf. Section 2), the calculation of entropy of i at time t can be
simplified asFig. 3. Multiple snapshots of i in timely-ordered sequence.Ht ¼ 
X
k
pklogðpkÞ ð2Þ
where pk is the probability of the kth trip in St .
Consider a simple example in Table 1. We have five consecutive
snapshots of an individual i, t ¼ 1; . . . ;5. In the 1st snapshot, i is
probable to make one of the trips fT1; T2; T3; T4g with correspond-
ing probabilities given in the table. In the 2nd snapshot, i is ob-
served to make a new trip T5. In the 4th and 5th snapshot, T3
disappears from the observation. For clarity, non-existing trips
(or tuples) are shown as blanks in the table. The probabilities show
the adversary’s information on the linkability of the vehicle trips to
a particular individual over time. However, only one trip at each
time (i.e., each row in the table) has actually happened.
Now imagine that the 6th snapshot is captured. Without con-
sidering snapshots accumulated in the past, the information con-
tained in S6 represents the highest uncertainty because all trips
are equally probable. However, if we also take into account the five
already existing snapshots, our intuition tells us that the historical
data might provide us with some useful information.
Based on the observed characteristics, we are aware that to in-
clude accumulated information in the metric, we need approaches
to process the information contained in the snapshots, propagate
such information along the timeline to the following snapshots,
and reflect the information in the measurement results.4. Measurements based on multiple snapshots
In this section, we propose two approaches to measure location
privacy in multiple snapshots. Specifically, the existing trip-based
location privacy metric is extended from a single snapshot to mul-
tiple timely-ordered snapshots. The extension to multiple snap-
shots takes into account the impact of accumulated information
on location privacy.4.1. Frequency based approach
One way to ‘‘learn from the past” is to check whether the same
trip has already been observed. Normally vehicle trips have some
patterns. For example, we might drive from home to work on a dai-
ly basis. Hence the information on the frequency of a particular trip
in the past gives hints on how probable the same trip will be re-
peated in a later point in time. For this we define an auxiliary var-
iable f tk that counts how often trip Tk has been linked to i over all
snapshots up to time t, i.e., f tk ¼ jfSijSi 2 S; i ¼ 1;2; . . . ; t;
9ðTk; pkÞ 2 Sigj. For example, in Table 1, at time t ¼ 6, T1 has oc-
curred 6 times so f 61 ¼ 6, whereas f 63 ¼ 4 holds. Then the fre-
quency-adjusted snapshot bSft of snapshot St ¼ fðTk; pkÞj . . .g can be
calculated as
bSft ¼ Tk;apkf tk ; k ¼ 1;2; . . . ;nt  ð3Þ
where a ¼ 1=Pkpkf tk is a normalization constant calculated by
requiring that all probabilities in bSft sum up to 1. Consequently,
the frequency-adjusted S6 isTable 1
A simple example with six consecutive snapshots of i.
t T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
t ¼ 1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
t ¼ 2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
t ¼ 3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2
t ¼ 4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
t ¼ 5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
t ¼ 6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
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Comparing bS6 with S6, the probability distribution changes from
equal to unequal. The corresponding entropy calculated by (2) is
also decreased from 2.32 for S6 to 2.31 for bS6, i.e., the accumulated
information helps to slightly reduce the uncertainty of the current
information.
However, using only the frequency of a particular trip does not
consider the actual probability of that trip in each snapshot. There-
fore, we lose information if we use only frequencies to adjust a
snapshot. For example, in Table 1, though T1 and T4 have the same
value of f tk ; T4 has a higher average probability than T1. To also in-
clude actual probability values in the frequency-adjustment, we
rewrite (3) as
bSwt ¼ Tk;apkwtk ; k ¼ 1;2; . . . ; nt  ð4Þ
in which we replace f tk by the average probability of the same trip,
i.e., wtk ¼
P
ip
i
k
 
f tk for i ¼ 1;2; . . . ; t. The normalization constant a
is changed to a ¼ 1=Pkpkwtk, accordingly. The probability of a
non-existing trip (e.g., T5 at t ¼ 1) is treated as 0, so the equation
can be kept in a generic form. Using (4), bSw6 turns out to bebSw6  fðT1;0:18Þ; ðT2;0:18Þ; ðT3; 0:24Þ; ðT4; 0:21Þ; ðT5;0:19Þg
with an entropy value of 2.31. The result again shows that accumu-
lated information, in terms of average probabilities of specific trips,
can change the current probability distribution and thus modify the
level of uncertainty. Furthermore, the result reflects the value of
probabilities of the trips in the past. For example, T3 has the highest
probability because it has been associated with high probabilities in
the past (i.e., 0.3 at t ¼ 1;2;3). On the other hand, even though
T1 and T2 appear at all snapshots, the relatively low probabilities
in the past cause these two trips to have the lowest value in the
probability distribution of bSw6 (i.e., both are 0.18). A more extensive
evaluation of this approach will be given in Section 5.
4.2. Bayesian approach
Our second approach to process, propagate, and reflect the
accumulated information is to use the Bayesian method to infer
information from the historical data.
4.2.1. Bayesian method
In principle, Bayesian method uses evidence to update a set of
hypotheses expressed numerically in probabilities. The core of
Bayesian method is the Bayes’ theorem. Let hk be the kth hypothesis
of a complete set of hypotheses H,3 the Bayes’ theorem can be writ-
ten as a function of hk as
PðhkjEÞ ¼ PðEjhkÞPðhkÞP
kPðEjhkÞPðhkÞ
ð5Þ
in which E is the evidence. PðhkjEÞ is the posterior probability of
hk because it is the conditional probability of hk given the evidence
E. PðEjhkÞ is the conditional probability of observing the evidence E if
the hypothesis hk is true. PðhkÞ is the prior probability of hk because it
is the probability of hk before it is updated by E. The denominator in
(5) is the sum of probabilities of observing the evidence E under all
possible hypotheses.
The above description accounts for updating the hypotheses
once. When applying Bayes’ theorem to situations in which
hypotheses are continuously updated by new evidence, the follow-
ing steps are usually involved:3 Notice that the notation H is conventionally used for both entropy and
hypotheses. We keep the convention and assume that the meaning should be clear
from the context. Initially define an exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses
H0.
 Before receiving new evidence E, generate a prior hypotheses
H. H is the same as H0 before the first update.
 After receiving the evidence E, calculate the posterior hypothe-
ses Hþ using (5). Hþ will be used as the prior hypotheses H
for the next update.
In Bayesian method, the initial hypotheses can be subjective,
i.e., we can assign probabilities to a hypotheses according to some
preliminary knowledge. If there are enough evidence, the hypoth-
eses will eventually be updated towards the objective truth.
The characteristics of the modeled accumulated information
make it appropriate to apply Bayesian method. Specifically, St con-
tains a set of possible trips and the corresponding probabilities.
Each of the trips can be regarded as a hypothesis of an individual
making that trip. St includes all the possible trips and only one of
them can be true. Therefore, the hypotheses are complete and
mutually exclusive. The corresponding probabilities in the snap-
shots are the evidence of those trips from observations. At each
time period, St contains a new set of evidence, which can be used
to update the hypotheses.
However, there is still an issue to be solved before we can apply
Bayesian method. It is very likely that St contains dynamic trip con-
stellations, e.g., fT1; T2; T3; T4g in S1 and fT1; T2; T3; T4; T5g in S2 (see
Table 1). The implication of such dynamics is that the set of
hypotheses H will be different from snapshot to snapshot. As
Bayesian method works on a fixed set of hypotheses, i.e., it does
not consider adding or removing one or more hypotheses during
the evidence updating process, we need a ‘‘smart” solution to apply
Bayesian method to solve this problem.
4.2.2. Exact algorithm
The solution is Algorithm 1 shown below. In general, for a given
snapshot at time t, the algorithm calculates the modified probabil-
ity distribution for this snapshot using the Bayesian method. Spe-
cifically, for each existing snapshot Sj; j ¼ 1;2; . . . ; t, the algorithm
generates a prior hypotheses Hj and uses the probability in Sj to
calculate the posterior hypotheses Hþj . The algorithm stores each
Hþj in a belief table B. Entries in B are called Belief because they
are posterior hypotheses updated by evidence that express the le-
vel of confidence of the algorithm on their ‘‘correctness”. The algo-
rithm also keeps tracks of the latest posterior hypotheses with the
same trip constellation. For example, S6 has the same trip constella-
tion as S3 in Table 1, so H
þ
3 will be the latest posterior hypotheses
with exactly the same trip constellation to S6. Informally, we use
Hþj lphSi, j < i to denote that Hþj is the latest posterior hypotheses
of Sj in B with a trip constellation that exactly matches the one
in snapshot Si.Algorithm 1. Calculate bSt using Bayesian method
Input: snapshots until time t; S1; . . . ; St
Output: snapshot at time t with modified probability distribution,bSt
1: for i ¼ 1 to t do
2: if found Hþj lphSi then
3: use Hþj as H

i
4: else
5: assign equal probabilities to Hi
6: end if
7: update Hi with the probabilities in Si, the result is H
þ
i
8: add Hþi to B
9: end for
10: replace the probability distribution in St with Hþt to obtain bSt ,
return bSt
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time t. Before processing a new snapshot Si, the algorithm first con-
sults B for the latest posterior hypotheses with the same trip con-
stellation as Si. If found, the posterior hypotheses H
þ
j will be used
as the prior hypotheses Hi for the current snapshot Si. If not found,
the algorithm assigns Hi with equally distributed probabilities.
The rationale is that we assign probabilities without any prejudices
to the initial hypotheses, believing that the evidence will eventu-
ally update the hypotheses towards the objective truth. Then Hi
is updated by Si to generate H
þ
i . Afterwards, H
þ
i is added to B. No-
tice that for efficiency, B only needs to keep the latest Hþ with a un-
ique trip constellation. Finally, Hþt replaces the probability
distribution in St to have bSt . bSt reflects the current beliefs expressed
in probabilities, which have been continuously updated by new
evidence, on each of the trips in the trip constellation in St . In line
7 of the algorithm, when using the probabilities in Si to update the
prior hypotheses, the notions in (5) can be substituted and rewrit-
ten as
p
Hþ
i
k ¼
pSik p
B
kP
kp
Si
k p
B
k
ð6Þ
in which p
Hþi
k and p
Si
k are the probabilities of the kth trip in
Hþi and Si, respectively. p
B
k is defined as
pBk ¼
p
Hþ
j
k if H
þ
j lph Si found
1
ni
if Hþj lph Si not found
8<: ð7Þ
in which p
Hþj
k is the probability of the kth trip of the latest posterior
hypotheses in B with the same trip constellation as Si, and ni is the
number of trips in Si.
We demonstrate how the algorithm works by calculating the
same example from Table 1. The results at each time period are
shown in Fig. 4. We also include H at each time period to show
how they are assigned and how they are updated by S to generate
Hþ. For example, at t ¼ 2, since the trip constellation of S2 appears
for the first time, H is assigned a equal probability distribution.
Look further down, at t ¼ 6, the latest snapshot with the same trips
constellation can be found at t ¼ 3. So the posterior probabilities
Hþ at t ¼ 3 is copies to the prior probabilities H at t ¼ 6. bS6 has
the same value as Hþ at t ¼ 6bS6  fðT1;0:19Þ; ðT2;0:1Þ; ðT3;0:42Þ; ðT4;0:19Þ; ðT5;0:09Þg
with entropy of 2.08. Comparing with the results from the fre-
quency based approaches in Section 4.1, we witness a more dra-
matic change in the probability distribution, as well as a sharp
decrease in entropy. The results show that Bayesian approach is
more effective to reflect the impact of accumulated information
Z. Ma et al. / Computer CommT1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
H- 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
H+ 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
H- 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
H+ 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
H- 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
H+ 0.19 0.1 0.42 0.19 0.1
H- 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
H+ 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
H- 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
H+ 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.36
H- 0.19 0.1 0.42 0.19 0.1
H+ 0.19 0.1 0.42 0.19 0.09
t
St (Evidence) B (Belief)
t=1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
0.2
t=2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
t=3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
0.2
t=4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
t=5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
t=6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Fig. 4. Example of Algorithm 1.than the frequency based approaches. We will further compare
and evaluate these approaches in the next section.5. Evaluation
5.1. Evaluation criteria
Our goal is to evaluate whether the privacy metric, now with
the extension for accumulate information, can really reflect the
underlying value of user location privacy in vehicular communica-
tion systems. For this purpose, we define two use-case-based eval-
uation criteria. The use cases specify scenarios likely to happen in
vehicular communication systems. The criteria are the expected
impacts of the scenarios on user location privacy. We simulate
the use cases. The simulation results will then be compared with
the criteria. The results give us clues as how good the metric can
be used to measure the long-term location privacy in vehicular
communication systems. We define the evaluation criteria as
1. if an individual has irregular trips with quite different origins
and destinations at each time, accumulated information should
provide less or even no additional information;
2. if an individual has regular trip patterns, accumulated informa-
tion should provide additional information. With this additional
information, it should be possible to detect an individual’s trip
patterns.
In our metric, the uncertainty of information is quantified in en-
tropy. A decrease in entropy indicates that additional information
leads to a decrease in uncertainty, i.e., a decrease in user location
privacy.5.2. Evaluation setup
We identify three parameters to have main influences on the
outcome of our location privacy metric. Among them are the trip
constellations in each snapshot, their corresponding probability
distributions, and the number of snapshots. First, the trip constel-
lation specifies the number of trips and their appearances observed
in a snapshot. Second, the probability distribution of the corre-
sponding trips specifies the information captured by a snapshot.
Third, the number of snapshots specifies the duration of the mea-
surement. Implicitly, it specifies the amount of accumulated infor-
mation available to the metric. By specifying these parameters, we
can create use cases to check whether the metric meets the evalu-
ation criteria. The use cases are the mock-ups of scenarios in the
real world. We have created a set of use cases to evaluate the met-
ric. However, due to the page limit, we include only three selected
use cases in this paper.
The first two use cases represent two opposite extremes. In the
1st use case, each of the snapshots has different trip constellations.
A series of such snapshots contain irregular trips. We imagine that
such scenario will happen, if either an individual makes different
trips each time or the observation of an adversary is of very bad
quality such that there are high confusions or uncertainties
associated with the obtained information. For each snapshot, the
simulation first generates a random trip index in the range of 1
to 100, then it generates the corresponding probabilities. To avoid
any subjectiveness in the probability assignment, the probabilities
are randomly generated from the uniform distribution. The process
is repeated to generate 60 snapshots with dynamic trip
constellations.
In the 2nd use case, all snapshots have the same trip constella-
tion. However, only one trip in the constellation actually happens.
Hence the snapshots contain a regular trip hidden among other
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1420 Z. Ma et al. / Computer Communications 33 (2010) 1414–1427observed trips. This scenario happens if an adversary has correctly
observed the regular trip such as driving from home to work, but
somehow cannot distinguish it from other trips observed at the
same time. To simulate such scenario, we generate 60 snapshots
with a trip index from 1 to 100. We set trip T1 in the constellation
as the one actually happened and assign a fixed probability, called
the p-value, to it. The remaining 99 trips are assigned with proba-
bilities from the uniform distribution. We set the p-value to be the
average, i.e., p ¼ 0:01, and normalize the probabilities of the
remaining 99 trips to ð1 p1Þ ¼ 0:99. The choice and impact of
the p-value will be further elaborated in Section 5.3.
The 3rd use case locates on the spectrum between the two ex-
treme cases described before, and contains several re-occurring
trips. It is a mock-up of a more realistic and common scenario as
specified in Table 2. Imagine there is a series of snapshots captur-
ing an individual’s vehicle trips for several weeks. All snapshots
cover a time period somewhen in the morning, so all the trips
are from home to somewhere. We simulate this by four trip con-
stellations. The first trip constellation for snapshots (Mon.–Wed.)
contains trips fT1; T4; . . . ; T100g. We set T1 as the trip actually hap-
pened and assign a p-value of 0.012. The corresponding probabili-
ties of fT4; T5; . . . ; T100g are assigned with probabilities from the
uniform distribution, and normalized to ð1 p1Þ ¼ 0:988. The sec-
ond trip constellation for snapshots (Thur.–Fri.) contains trips
fT2; T4; . . . ; T100g. We set T2 as actually happened and also assign
a p-value of 0.012, and the normalized probabilities to
fT4; T5; . . . ; T100g. The third trip constellation for snapshots (Sat.)
contains trips fT3; T4; . . . ; T100g. We assign a p-value of 0.012 to
T3 and the normalized probabilities to fT4; T5; . . . ; T100g. The last
trip constellation for snapshots (Sun.) has trips fT4; T5; . . . ; T100g.
To simulate random destinations on Sundays, we assign all the
trips with probabilities from the uniform distribution. We repeat
the process and generate 56 snapshots to simulate 8 weeks of
snapshots with re-occurring trips.
During the simulation, we generate snapshots corresponding to
the use cases and feed them to the location privacy metric. The
outcome of the metric is analyzed along the evaluation criteria.
For our analysis, we choose the following entropy values: (1)
Hmax, the theoretical maximum entropy based on each single snap-
shot; (2) H, the entropy based only on single snapshot; (3) Hf , the
entropy based on the snapshots modified by frequencies of occur-
rence; (4) Hw, the entropy based on the snapshots modified by
average probabilities; and (5) HB, the entropy based on the snap-
shots modified by Bayesian approach.
To analyze the impact of accumulated information on the actual
level of uncertainty, we further define Hd as a measurement of the
decrease in uncertainty
Hd ¼ HB  HH 100% ð8Þ
which bases the calculation on the difference of the entropy using
Bayesian approach and the entropy based on single snapshot with-
out any additional information.Table 2
Third use case setup.
Scenario Simulation
Vehicle trips Trip constellation Probability assignment
Home to office A
(Mon.–Wed.)
fT1; T4; . . . ; T100g p1 ¼ 0:012;
Pi¼100
i¼4 pi ¼ 1 p1
Home to office B
(Thur.–Fri.)
fT2; T4; . . . ; T100g p2 ¼ 0:012;
Pi¼100
i¼4 pi ¼ 1 p2
Home to shopping
mall C (Sat.)
fT3; T4; . . . ; T100g p3 ¼ 0:012;
Pi¼100
i¼4 pi ¼ 1 p3
Home to a random
destination (Sun.)
fT4; T5; . . . ; T100g Random, Pi¼100i¼4 pi ¼ 15.3. Simulation
Fig. 5 shows the simulation result from the 1st use case, in
which each snapshot contains a randomly generated trip constella-
tion. We can see from the figure that the entropies of H;Hf ;Hw, and
HB are so close that they overlap each other most of the time. This
means neither frequency based approaches nor Bayesian approach
are able to benefit from the accumulated information. Besides,
these entropies are very close to the upper-bound Hmax, due to
the fact that the probabilities in each snapshot are from uniform
distributions. For illustrative reason, the lower part of the figure in-
cludes a bar chart showing the number of trips in each of the snap-
shots. Notice that the actually trip constellations are not shown in
the bar chart.
Fig. 6 shows what the metric result of the 2nd use case, which
simulates the scenario that a regular trip is blurred by other false
observations in each snapshot. The result shows that the frequency
based approaches can barely reflect the accumulated information.
As a result, Hf and Hw mostly overlap H, with the exception that
Hw has slightly lower entropies at the first few snapshots. On the
other hand, Bayesian approach has significantly decreased the en-5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 600
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Fig. 6. Entropy of regular trips.
Fig. 8. Change of uncertainty.
Z. Ma et al. / Computer Communications 33 (2010) 1414–1427 1421tropy level from 6.3 bits to as low as 0.79 bits at the 33rd snapshot.
Obviously, at 0.79 bits, the uncertainty is very low, i.e., the privacy
level is very low. The shape of the curve of HB suggests that Bayes-
ian approach is able to process and benefit from the accumulated
information.
Fig. 7 shows the simulation result from the 3rd use case. The 3rd
use case simulates weekly re-occurring trips. Hf and Hw have sim-
ilar outcomes as those in Fig. 6, i.e., frequency based approaches
cannot really benefit from accumulated information in the long
run. Again, Bayesian approach has significantly decreased the en-
tropy value. Interestingly, this time the curve of HB has a cascading
and downward shape. The reason is that we have simulated four
types of re-occurring trips in this use case. The first three trips
are regularly occurred trips and the fourth one (i.e., the Sunday
trip) is chosen to be random. Therefore, while the overall curve
of HB demonstrates a downward trend, the entropies correspond-
ing to the first three trips decrease much faster than the entropy
of the Sunday trip. Notice that the entropy of the Sunday trip also
exhibits a downward trend. The reason is that even though the
probability distributions of the Sunday trip are from the uniform
distribution, their values are slightly different among each others.
As a result, the probabilities are modified by Bayesian approach to-
wards a non-uniform distribution. In other words, given consecu-
tive snapshots, Algorithm 1 regards some of the trips are ‘‘more
likely to have happened” than others. The result again demon-
strates that Bayesian approach can take advantage of the accumu-
lated information caused by regularly occurring trips.
As the next step, we use Hd to analyze the decrease in uncer-
tainty in each of the use cases. Since a new set of random values
is generated each time a use case is simulated, we run each use
case 100 times and calculate the mean values to take into account
the effects of the variations of random variables. The results are
plotted in Fig. 8. For irregular trips, taking more snapshots into
the metric does not decrease information uncertainty. In some
cases, it even increases the level of uncertainty. This means based
on the metric, accumulated information does not provide any addi-
tional information due to the randomness in the captured informa-
tion. For regular trips, we can see that there is a constant decrease
in uncertainty as more and more snapshots are added in the se-
quence. The decrease reaches 84.6% at the 60th snapshot. The
outcome of the metric shows that with regular trips, accumulated
information can significantly reduce the uncertainty in the infor-
mation related to user location privacy. For re-occurring trips, de-7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56
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Fig. 7. Entropy of re-occurring trips.spite the spikes on each Sunday due to the randomness of the trips
on that day, there is also a constant decrease in uncertainty as the
time elapses. Because there are several regular trip patterns in-
volved in this use case, the speed of the decrease in uncertainty
is slower than the use case with regular trips. The result demon-
strates again that the accumulated information can cause consider-
able decreases in the level of uncertainty, i.e., users’ location
privacy. Notice that the shape of the curves in Fig. 8 correspond
to those appeared in Figs. 5–7, i.e., the observations we made be-
fore on single simulation result also hold in general cases.
We know that themain reason behind the significant decrease in
uncertainty is because of the application of Bayesian method in
Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 processes, propagates, and reflects the
accumulated information by continuously updating the probabili-
ties in each hypotheses after a new set of evidence contained in a
snapshot is received. The updated hypotheses are kept in the belief
table B. As a result, the probability distributions in the belief table
converge toward the ‘‘real happened” trips. The changing of proba-
bility distributions leads to lower entropy values and hence a de-
crease in uncertainty. However, so far we have not shown
whether the algorithm is able to update probability distributions
in a correct way. We test the correctness of Algorithm 1 by tracing
the change of beliefs in the belief table. In this sense, the second and
the third use case are quite similar. Therefore, we only show the
study on the 2nd use case here. Same as before, we assign the first
trip as the one actually happened. Furthermore, we assign different
probabilities to study the effect of the p-values on the performance
of the algorithm. The p-values are {0.009,0.01,0.011}, which corre-
spond to 10% lower than the average, the average, and 10% higher
than the average of the probability of the 100 trips in the trip con-
stellation. Again, we run the simulation 100 times to account for the
variations in the randomdataset and calculate themeans of the first
trip in the 100 simulation runs.
Fig. 9 shows the result. At 10% below the average, Algorithm 1
almost fails to detect the trip. However, as soon as the p-value is
of the average value, there is a steady rise of the probability. If
we assume that 0.5 is the threshold to select a trip as the one really
happens, the first trip will be selected at the 59th snapshot. Only
slightly increase the p-value 10% higher, the probability of the first
trip exhibits a sharp rise and passes the 0.5 threshold at the 32nd
snapshot.
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Fig. 9. Change of beliefs with different p-values.
1422 Z. Ma et al. / Computer Communications 33 (2010) 1414–1427From the simulation results, we conclude that our location pri-
vacy metric and the related approach meet both evaluation criteria
defined in Section 5.1.6. Heuristic algorithm for dynamic trip constellations
Algorithm 1 in Section 4.2.2 relies on finding posterior hypoth-
eses (i.e., Hþ) of the previous snapshots with exactly the same trip
constellations to propagate the beliefs. Therefore, it functions well
on snapshots containing regular trip patterns, in which snapshots
with same trip constellations appear frequently. Imagine if an indi-
vidual can be linked to different sets of trips in each of the snap-
shots, Algorithm 1 will likely wait for a very long period of time
until it has the same trip constellation again. In the worst case, a
specific trip constellation might even never happen more than
once. The simulation results in Figs. 5 and 8 have already shown
the negative effect of snapshots with dynamic trip constellations.
To have a robuster way to process and reflect accumulated
information in the privacy measurements, in this section, we de-
velop a heuristic algorithm as an important extension to Algorithm
1 and evaluate its feasibility to work with dynamic trip constella-
tions in Section 7.6.1. Finding an adequate measurement of similarity
A trip constellation is a set of trips associated with a specific
individual in a snapshot. The biggest difference in the heuristic
algorithm is that, instead of searching for a snapshot with an iden-
tical trip constellation, now the heuristic algorithm searches for a
snapshot with the most similar trip constellation. Then the beliefs
(i.e., the posterior hypotheses) from the previous snapshot are used
an input to construct the prior hypotheses of the later snapshot.
Recall that originally, Bayesian method is intended to work on a
fixed set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypothesis during
the evidence update process (cf. Section 4.2.1), our solution to
tackle the trip dynamics is an heuristic approach. However, our
rationale is that, if the beliefs are propagated between two snap-
shots with the most similarities, the distortions during the belief
propagation will be kept at a minimum. In fact, because two iden-
tical trip constellations are the most ‘‘similar” ones, a search for the
most similar will return the identical trip constellation, if it exists.
The question arises as ‘‘how to find an adequate notion of sim-
ilarity?” Intuitively, two snapshots are more similar, the more tripsthey have in common. To quantitatively express the concept of
‘‘similarity”, we can count the number of trips presented in both
snapshots, as well as those only appeared at respective ones. An
elegant way to count the occurrence of trips in a snapshot is to
convert the set-based snapshot representation in (1) to binary
strings. Let n be the number of all unique trips appeared in all snap-
shots up to St , formally: n ¼
S
S0i
 ; i ¼ 1;2; . . . ; t with S0i ¼
fTkj9ðTk; pkÞ 2 Sig. Then the trip constellation of Si expressed by a
binary string ci is
ci ¼ ½T1; T2; . . . ; Tn with Tk ¼
1 if 9ðTk; pkÞ 2 Si
0 otherwise

ð9Þ
in which we use 1 for an existing trip and 0 for a non-existing trip
within snapshot Si. Notice that n is a constant, so all binary strings
will have the same length of n bits. This also means that to convert
the trip constellation in a snapshot to a binary string, we might
need to pad all snapshots retrospectively to have the same length
for all ci; i ¼ 1;2; . . . ; t. For example, in Table 1, at t ¼ 1, c1 will be
[1,1,1,1], while at t ¼ 2, by retrospective padding, c1 becomes
[1,1,1,1,0] and c2 will be [1,1,1,1,1].
For two binary strings with equal length, the hamming distance
[15] is a measure of the number of positions where there are differ-
ent bits. For example, the hamming distance of [1,1,1,1,0] and
[1,1,1,1,1] is 1. Therefore, we can use hamming distance to mea-
sure the similarity of two snapshots. Hence, the hamming distance
between two snapshots (or more precisely, the trip constellations
in the two snapshots) expresses explicitly the difference in their
trip constellations. The more trips in common, the smaller the
hamming distance, hence the more similar are the two snapshots.
Therefore, for St , we can calculate the hamming distances from
St to each of the previous snapshots S1; S2; . . . ; St1. We regard the
snapshot with the smallest hamming distance the most similar
snapshot to St . In case more than one snapshot have the same ham-
ming distances, we choose the latest one. This is also in accordance
with Algorithm 1, which looks for the latest posterior hypotheses
with the same trip constellation.
6.2. Constellation fitting
After finding the most similar snapshot, the next question is
‘‘how to propagate the beliefs between two snapshots so there will
be minimum distortions?” In case of the exact match as in Algo-
rithm 1, this is done by taking the whole posterior hypotheses
Hþ of the previous snapshot from the belief table B, and using them
as the prior hypotheses H of the current snapshot.
Knowing that the trip constellations in the two snapshots will
most likely to match only partially, we need to find a solution to
align the hypotheses so we can propagate the probabilities from
Hþ to H. We call this the ‘‘constellation fitting” problem, i.e., to
shape and fit the current trip constellation into the previous one
such that the current snapshot can heuristically inherit the associ-
ated hypotheses of the previous one with minimum distortions.
To propagate beliefs between two sets of similar but not exact
matching hypotheses with minimum distortions, we made two
decisions in our heuristic algorithm. The feasibility will be evalu-
ated by simulations in Section 7. The two decisions are:
1. if a posterior hypothesis of a trip exists, it will be used as the
prior hypothesis for the same trip in the current snapshot;
2. otherwise, the prior hypothesis of the trip in the current snap-
shot will be given an equally distributed probability.
As the probabilities in a hypotheses should sum up to 1, we also
normalize the probability distribution in a hypotheses in the pro-
cess when it is necessary.
Z. Ma et al. / Computer Communications 33 (2010) 1414–1427 1423Although two snapshots might be similar with respect to their
trip constellations, there are various ways that such similarities
can be. Because the various relations between two trip constella-
tions directly influence the probability assignment for prior hypoth-
eses in the heuristic algorithm,wewill first elaborate on the possible
relations and their corresponding probability assignments, and
present the detailed description of the algorithm afterwards.
Let Si be the current snapshot and Sj be the most similar snap-
shot in the past, j < i, we can derive five kinds of relations between
Si and Sj. The first one is the exact match, i.e., the trip constella-
tions in Si and Sj are identical, which is the case considered in
Algorithm 1. Beside the exact match, the other four relations are
illustrated in Fig. 10. For simplicity, in the following description,
we treat a snapshot as a set containing only trips, and omit the cor-
responding probabilities (cf. (1)), e.g., Si ¼ fT1; T2; . . . ; Tnig. More-
over, we use Hi to denote the prior hypotheses of Si and H
þ
j for
the posterior hypotheses of Sj stored in the belief table B. Hence
we have four relations as:
(a) Disjoint relation might happen when Sj is most similar to Si,
despite Sj and Si have completely different sets of trips. For
example, if S1 ¼ fT1; T2g and S2 ¼ fT3; T4g; S1 will be the
‘‘choice” for S2 because c1 has the smallest hamming dis-
tance to c2. In this case, Si has a complete new trip constel-
lation, and Hi will not inherit any beliefs from Sj. Hence
Hi are assigned equal probabilities, which is similar to line
5 in Algorithm 1.
(b) Intersected relation might be the most occurring relation for
two similar-but-not-identical snapshots. In this relation,
Si and Sj will share some trips in common, but have different
sets of trips to their own at the same time. For example,
S1 ¼ fT1; T2; T3; T4g and S2 ¼ fT1; T3; T5; T6g have an inter-
section of fT1; T3g. The unique trips to S2 is S2 n S1
¼ fT5; T6g. To assign probabilities to Hi , we let the trips in
the intersection inherit the probabilities of the same trips
in Hþj , and the rest of the trips in H

i are equally assigned
the remaining probability.
(c) In subset relation, Si is a subset of Sj, i.e., all trips in Si are also
in Sj. The trips in H

i will inherit all corresponding probabil-
ities of the same trips in Hþj . Since we have only a subset of
Hþj , we need to normalize the probabilities in H

i to 1.
(d) In superset relation, Si is a superset of Sj, i.e., Si includes all
trips in Sj plus some other trips. To assign probabilities, we
first let all trips in Si but not in Sj (i.e., Si n Sj) to have the equal
probabilities, so these trips can have unbiased initial hypoth-
eses. Then we let all trips also in Sj inherit the corresponding
probabilities from Hþj . We further normalize the inherited
probabilities to the remaining probability inHi . For example,
for S1 ¼ fT1; T2; T3g and S2 ¼ fT1; T2; T3; T4; T5g; T4 and T5 in
H2 will each have a probability of
1
5, the probabilities of
T1; T2; T3 will be taken from H
þ
1 and normalized to
3
5.
Notice that at any time, Si will contain only two possible sets of
trips: the trips as also in Sj and the trips not in Sj. The design of the
probability assignment for Hi reflects our idea to use the existing
beliefs while avoiding prejudicing the hypotheses of ‘‘newly-ap-
peared” trips.
6.3. Heuristic algorithm
The heuristic algorithm has a similar structure as Algorithm 1,
except the search for similar snapshots and the probability assign-
ment for the prior hypotheses. The details of the heuristic algo-
rithm are given in Algorithm 2.
Notice that line 5 in Algorithm 2 searches for the latest snapshot
with the trip constellation of minimum hamming distance to Si.Line 6 to line 16 is the probability assignment for the prior hypoth-
eses Hi . Also notice that line 8 to line 15 correspond to the four
relations outlined in Fig. 10. Furthermore, because two snapshots
with an identical trip constellation have a hamming distance of
0, and Algorithm 2 always searches for the latest snapshot with
the smallest hamming distance, the heuristic algorithm will func-
tion exactly as the ‘‘exact” algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1) when there
are snapshots with same trip constellations in the series. In other
words, Algorithm 2 is fully compatible with Algorithm 1.Algorithm 2. Heuristic algorithm to calculate bSt
Input: snapshots until time t; S1; . . . ; St
Output: snapshot at time t with modified probability distribution,bSt
1: for i ¼ 1 to t do
2: for l ¼ 1 to i do
3: convert trip index in Sl to binary string cl and pad to equal
length
4: end for
5: find cj with minimum hamming distance to ci; j < i; i j is
minimum
6: if hamming distance = 0 then
7: Hi ¼ Hþj
8: else if Si
T
Sj ¼ ; then
9: assign trips with probability of 1jSi j
10: else if Si
T
Sj–; then
11: assign trips in Si
T
Sj with probabilities from H
þ
j , and trips
in Si n Sj with probability of ð1
P
pkÞ
jSinSj j
12: else if Si# Sj then
13: assign trips with probabilities of p
0
kP
p0
k
; p0k are probabilities
from Hþj
14: else if Si  Sj then
15: assign trips in Si n Sj with probability of 1jSi j, and trips in Sj
with probabilities of ð1PpcÞp0k; p0k are probabilities from
Hþj
16: end if
17: update Hi with the probabilities in Si , the result is H
þ
i
18: add Hþi to B
19: end for
20: replace the probability distribution in St with Hþt to obtain bSt ,
return bStTo demonstrate how Algorithm 2 works, we show a simple
example in Fig. 11. Similar to the example in Fig. 4, the figure
shows the snapshot and their corresponding prior and posterior
hypotheses. Besides, there is an extra column to show the latest
most similar snapshot (LMSS) of each snapshot. The example in-
cludes six snapshots with very dynamic trip constellations. The
snapshots include all five relations we outlined in Section 6.2.
For example, S2 and S1 have disjoint relation, S3 and S2 have inter-
sected relation, S4 and S2 have subset relation, S5 and S3 have sup-
erset relation, and S6 and S1 match exactly. The prior hypotheses
H at each time period demonstrate how prior probabilities are
assigned according to Algorithm 2. Notice that the calculation of
posterior hypotheses Hþ is the same in both Algorithms 1 and 2.
7. Evaluation of heuristic algorithm
Comparing to Algorithm 1, the heuristic algorithm involves
more variables that are of interest in the evaluation, such as trip
constellations and the dynamics of the constellations. Due to the
page limit, we cannot evaluate all the variables and their combina-
tions. Because our focus is on the feasibility of the heuristic algo-
rithm, we choose the most important aspects related to the
Fig. 10. Various relations of Sj and Si .
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we will evaluate the heuristic algorithm with respect to the con-
stellation dynamics, the probability of the ‘‘real” trip, and clusters
of re-appearing trips, respectively.
7.1. Evaluation with respect to constellation dynamics
Snapshots with dynamic trip constellations model the scenario
in which an adversary is able to ‘‘correctly” link an individual to a
specific trip. However, due to uncertainties, the real trip is mixed
with a set of false trips in each of the snapshots, such that from
the adversary’s perspective, the correct information is submerged
and concealed by incorrect information. To make things worse, in
each snapshot, the real trip is presented with a different set of false
trips that form a different trip constellation. The consequence is a
sequence of snapshots with dynamic trip constellations.
The heuristic algorithm is developed to cope with constellation
dynamics. Hence, we expect that Algorithm 2 can propagate beliefs
under dynamic trip constellations. Furthermore, we are also inter-
ested in the performance of the algorithm under different degrees
of constellation dynamics. Following the same approach in Section
6.1, we express the degree of constellation dynamics between two
snapshots by their hamming distance. The bigger the hamming
distance, the more dynamic are the trip constellations along the
timeline.
In order to simulate such scenario, we generate a dataset of 60
snapshots with 100 trips each. We specify the first trip T1 as the
‘‘real” trip. If all trips are assumed to be equally probable, they will
have a probability of 0.01 each. However, we assume that the real
trip will have a slightly higher than the average probability if it
really occurs. Therefore, we assign 0.011 to T1, which is 10% higher
than the average probability. Another reason for the 10% higher is
that it yields a good result in the previous simulation of Algorithm
1 (cf. Fig. 9). Other trips (i.e., fT2; T3; . . . ; T100g) are given random
probabilities from the uniform distribution.
The next step is to find a way to distribute the 100 trips, so we
can have a sequence of snapshots with dynamic trip constellations.T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
H- 0.5 0.5
H+ 0.4 0.6
H- 0.33 0.33 0.33
H+ 0.3 0.5 0.2
H- 0.2 0.3 0.5
H+ 0.049 0.22 0.73
H- 0.71 0.29
H+ 0.79 0.21
H- 0.04 0.16 0.55 0.25
H+ 0.01 0.15 0.68 0.16
H- 0.4 0.6
H+ 0.61 0.39
t
St (Evidence) B (Belief)
t=1 0.4 0.6
LMSS
1
t=6 0.7 0.3
t=2 0.3 0.5 0.2
t=3 0.1 0.3 0.6
t=5 0.1 0.4 0.20.3
t=4 0.6 0.4
1
2
2
3
1
Fig. 11. Example of Algorithm 2.One possibility is to distribute the trips randomly. However, in this
case, it is difficult to have a clear picture of the relation between
the trip dynamics to the results from the heuristic algorithm.
Therefore, we control the degree of constellation dynamics so we
can evaluate the heuristic algorithm in a controlled manner. We
achieve this by shifting all trips after T1 to the right, each time a
new snapshot is generated. For example, if we want the 2nd snap-
shot to have 10% constellation dynamics to the 1st snapshot with
trips fT1; T2; . . . ; T100g, we shift the trip block of fT2; T3; . . . ; T100g of
the 2nd snapshot 10 trips to the right, so the trip index becomes
fT1; T12; T13; . . . ; T110g. Consequently, 10% of the trips in the 2nd
snapshot (i.e., fT101; T102; . . . ; T110g) are different from the 1st snap-
shot. The idea is illustrated in Fig. 12. For simplicity, we show an
example of only 6 snapshots with 10 trips each. In the figure, a
black square indicates an existing trip. All snapshots in the figure
have a 10% constellation dynamics to the one before, i.e., each lat-
ter snapshot has one trip different from the former snapshot. In
other words, each two neighboring snapshots have 10  90% ¼ 9
trips in common.
We construct snapshots with different constellation dynamics
and observe the change of beliefs on the real trip T1. The goal is
to evaluate the performance of the heuristic algorithm under var-
ious constellation dynamics. Fig. 13 shows some of the selected re-
sults with constellation dynamics of 1%, 10%, and 50%. The results
are averaged over 100 simulation runs for each value of constella-
tion dynamics to account for the variations in the random dataset.
For 1% constellation dynamics, Algorithm 2 has a similar good re-
sult as Algorithm 1 (cf. Fig. 9). This means that the heuristic algo-
rithm is able to propagate beliefs among snapshots with dynamic
trip constellations, resulting in an increase in the belief on the real
trip. Notice that because the hamming distances are fixed between
any two consecutive snapshots, the heuristic algorithmwill always
find the directly precedent snapshot as the most similar one and
use Hþ from that one as the basis for the construction of H. There-
fore, the hypotheses are continuously updated and the two
algorithms yield similar results. However, the beliefs on T1 go
down when the constellation dynamics increase. This matches
our intuition that if there are more dynamics in the trip constella-
tions (i.e., a real trip is associated with a different set of false trips1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
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Fig. 12. Snapshots with 10% constellation dynamics.
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Fig. 13. Changes of beliefs on T1 with different degree of constellation dynamics.
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Fig. 14. Changes of beliefs with different p-values.
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sibilities to detect a really happened trip.7.2. Evaluation with respect to p-value
The p-value (cf. Fig. 9) is the probability assigned to the real trip
in each of the snapshots in the dataset. By specifying different
probabilities of the real trip, we model an adversary’s ability to link
an individual to his or her vehicle movements.
In Section 7.1, we have shown that the heuristic algorithm per-
forms well with a 10% higher than the average p-value under fixed
constellation dynamics. However, we can imagine that a fixed con-
stellation dynamics will be rare in most realistic scenarios. There-
fore, we use snapshots with totally random trip constellations to
evaluate Algorithm 2 with respect to different p-values. Total ran-
domness also means that the constellation dynamics is at its
maximum.
For the dataset, we randomly generate trips in the range from 2
to 100 for each of the snapshot. Hence each snapshot has a random
number of trips and the trip indices are random as well. Same as
before, we specify T1 as the real trip so it appears in all snapshots.
Furthermore, we assign T1 with the p-value and probabilities from
the uniform distribution to the rest of the trips. The rest of the trips
are then normalized to ð1 p1Þ. We choose two kinds of p-values:
absolute values and variable values. Since now each snapshot con-
tains a various amount of trips, the absolute p-value is a constant
probability throughout all snapshots, and the variable p-value is
the average probability at each snapshot (i.e., p1 ¼ 1jSt j at time t)
multiplied by a scaling factor. The p-values are: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03
for the absolute and 10%, 30%, 50%, and 70% higher than the aver-
age for the variable. For each of the p-values, we run the simulation
100 times and take the averages of the beliefs on T1 from the belief
table B. The results are shown in Fig. 14.
By observing the simulation results, we made several interest-
ing observations. First, the curves with high p-values have ripples
in the short-term and exhibit an upward trend in the long-term.
The ripples are due to the fluctuations in the hypotheses because
the heuristic algorithm searches for the most similar snapshot in
the past. For example, for the 10th snapshot, the algorithm might
find that the 2nd snapshot has the most similar trip constellation,
and construct H10 based on H
þ
2 . As a result, the updated beliefs on
T1 between the 3rd and 9th snapshots are not involved in the con-
struction of H10. However, in the long-term, the heuristic algorithmis able to benefit from the accumulated information. Thus the long-
term beliefs on T1 increase.
Second, if the probability of the real trip is below a certain
threshold, the heuristic algorithm is unable to detect the trip. This
is demonstrated by the curves representing p-values of absolute
0.01 and variable 10% higher in the figure. Notice that in previous
evaluations, 10% higher p-value gives a very quick rise to the be-
liefs on T1. The reason for the slow rise here is that the hypothesis
of T1 in the previous settings is continuously updated, while in our
current setting, due to the same reason that causes the ripples, the
hypothesis of T1 is updated based on the posterior hypothesis from
a randomly found snapshot with most similar trip constellation.
However, looking closely, we can see that the curve of 10% higher
actually increases. A measurement on the 10% higher curve con-
firms that there is an 88% increase at the 60th snapshot comparing
to the value at the 1st snapshot.
Third, the relation of low p-values to low beliefs corresponds to
our intuition that if an adversary fails to capture correct informa-
tion on a real trip and give it an ‘‘outstanding treatment” in the
probability assignment, the trip will be concealed among others
and no adversaries can derive any useful information from that.
In this sense, our findings here provide two interesting privacy
thresholds for the design of privacy-protection mechanisms. If
each time an individual has a trip and the trip can be mistaken
by an adversary with no more than 99 other trips, a privacy-pro-
tection mechanism should be able to conceal the real trip among
the others, in which the probability of the real trip is no more than
0.01 or no higher than 10% of the average of the trips at the same
time.7.3. Evaluation with respect to cluster of re-appearing trips
The evaluation in Section 7.2 specifies T1 as the real trip through
out all the snapshots. All other trips are generated randomly and
hence might not appear in every snapshot. Thus a question arises
as whether the high occurrence of T1 biases the heuristic
algorithm?
To answer this question, we use clusters of re-appearing trips to
evaluate the fairness of the heuristic algorithm. Specifically, when
generating the dataset, instead of placing only T1 in each of the
snapshots, we specify a set of trips to appear in all snapshots as
well. Thus T1 and other trips in the set form a trip cluster among
other randomly generated trips in each of the snapshots. Conse-
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Fig. 15. Beliefs on trip clusters at 60th snapshot.
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the heuristic algorithm at the same time. Then we can check
whether the hypothesis of T1 is treated equally as the others in
the cluster.
For simulations, we generate 60 snapshots with maximum 100
trips each. We specify three cluster sizes, i.e., 10 trips from T1 to
T10, 20 trips from T1 to T20, and 50 trips from T1 to T50. Each snap-
shot includes a trip cluster together with other randomly gener-
ated trips. We assign a 10% higher than the average probability
to T1. The rest of the trips are assigned probabilities from the uni-
form distribution. For each cluster size, we run the simulation 100
times. Then we take the averaged beliefs corresponding to the trips
in the cluster at the 60th snapshot from the belief table B. The re-
sults are shown in Fig. 15. As clearly demonstrated by the figure, T1
has the highest belief at the 60th snapshot for all three cluster
sizes. Thus we conclude that the occurrence of a trip does not bias
the heuristic algorithm, and the algorithm performs correctly.
Based on the simulation results, we conclude that the heuristic
algorithm is robust and powerful to process, propagate, and reflect
the accumulated information in the location privacy metric under
dynamic situations.
8. Related work
Anonymity and (un)linkability are two of the common ap-
proaches to express user privacy in communication systems. A def-
inition on these two terms is given in [27] and unlinkability is
further refined in [32].
The size of the anonymity set, e.g., k-anonymity [33], is a pop-
ular quantitative measurement of anonymity. Gruteser and Grun-
wald [13] apply k-anonymity to the design of a cloaking
algorithm for anonymous usage of location information, and show
that a quantitative privacy measurement is crucial in the develop-
ment of privacy-protection mechanisms. The authors of [30,5]
point out that the size of the anonymity set does not reflect differ-
ent probabilities of the members in the set, and propose to use en-
tropy of the anonymity set as the metric for anonymity for mix
networks.
A main feature of location privacy is user movements, which is
not explicitly captured and expressed by anonymity set. Hung et al.
[19] propose geographical anonymity set, which is a set of user
identifiers that forms an anonymity set geographically due to theirindistinguishable movements in space and time. Beresford et al. [2]
propose the concept of mix zone, an area in which users’ move-
ments cannot be observed, and to use entropy of the mix zone to
quantify the information obtained by an adversary on the user
movements through mix zones. Applying the same principle, the
authors in [4,10] use the entropy provided by the mix zones to
evaluate the level of location privacy achieved by the vehicles in
vehicular ad hoc neworks (VANET). In [9], a flow-based metric is
proposed to measure the effectiveness of mix zones and use it as
a basis for the optimal placement of mix zones in mobile networks.
Tracking, which learns a vehicle’s movement by linking a series
of messages from that vehicle, is another common approach to
measure location privacy. Gruteser and Hoh [14] propose to use
tracking algorithms to characterize the level of location privacy.
Sampigethaya et al. [28] use maximum tracking time to evaluate
the location privacy of vehicles in VANET. Hoh et al. [17] use the
mean time to confusion to measure the privacy level of vehicles
sending GPS traces in a traffic monitoring system. Fischer et al.
[8] propose to measure unlinkability of sender-message relations
based on the outer and inner structures of the set partitions of
the observed messages. Most approaches to location privacy focus
on location information. In [23], we propose that metrics for loca-
tion privacy in vehicular communication systems should take both
individuals and their vehicle trips into consideration.
The impact of accumulated information on location privacy has
not been explicitly addressed in most of these approaches so far.
Mostly, it is assumed that an adversary’s knowledge on a system
already reflects its long-term observations at the time of attack.
For example, in most of the mix zone approaches, an adversary is
assumed to have the statistical data on the user mobility in the
mix zone. Empirical studies such as [21] use two weeks of recorded
pseudonymous location tracks to infer home addresses and identi-
ties of the drivers with partial successes. Outside the communica-
tion domain, the authors of [35] find out that snapshot-based,
time-invariant approaches cannot cope with the emergence of
time series data mining, and propose to add the time dimension
to the current research on privacy-preserving data mining.9. Conclusion and outlook
In this paper, we present our approaches and algorithms in the
formof a trip-based locationprivacymetric formeasuring long-term
location privacy of the users of vehicular communication systems.
Toprecisely reflectunderlyingprivacyvalues invehicular communi-
cation systems, we take accumulated information into consider-
ation. We develop approaches and algorithms to model, process,
propagate, and reflect the impact of accumulated information in pri-
vacy measurements. Moreover, in this paper we present two algo-
rithms to apply the Bayesian method to process and propagate
accumulated informationamongmultiple snapshots along the time-
line. Specifically, the first algorithm propagates information among
snapshots with exactly matching trip constellations. The second
algorithm is a heuristic extension to the first one, which is robust
to function on snapshots with highly dynamic trip constellations.
We also design methods to evaluate the feasibility and correctness
of the approaches and algorithms by various case studies and exten-
sive simulations. We show in this paper that accumulated informa-
tion canhave significant impacts on the level of locationprivacy. The
results and findings in this paper provides some valuable insights
into location privacy, which contribute to the development of fu-
ture-proof, privacy-preserving vehicular communication systems.
An important aspect of our work is to demonstrate the practica-
bility and feasibility of using the trip-based location privacy metric
to measure privacy values and improve privacy-enhanced designs
in vehicular communication systems. For this reason, we have
Z. Ma et al. / Computer Communications 33 (2010) 1414–1427 1427gathered a collection of datasets of realistic vehicle trips from var-
ious sources. In our future work, based on the realistic datasets, we
will further evaluate our approaches and algorithms by more use-
case-based scenarios. The evaluation will also include existing pri-
vacy-protection mechanisms proposed to vehicular communica-
tion systems. The current metric only measures privacy of
individual users. The possible interrelations among individuals
and their impacts on the level of location privacy will be investi-
gated to determine location privacy in a global view. The metric
is extensible, which means we can take other identified attacks
on location privacy into respect in our metric whenever necessary.
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